In 1999, Tan and Zhu proposed a remote password authentication scheme that is the first remote login scheme using smart cards based on cross product of matrixes. The scheme is efficient and flexible as compared with other matrix-based remote authentication schemes. However, Chien, Jan, and Tseng have shown that an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user to login the system in the scheme. This paper will present another possible attack on Tan-Zhu scheme and it may also threaten the security of the scheme. If the format checking for the identities of users is not sufficient in the authentication phase of the protocol, the proposed attack will be valid such that attackers can forge valid authentication messages for the users who have not registered with the system yet and then successfully login the system.
Introduction
Due to security and cost efficiency, smart cards are usually adopted to store the secret information of users in many remote authentication protocols [1, 2, 7, 8] . By presenting the smart card and inputting the correct password, the cardholder can login the remote system or server. In a secure remote authentication scheme, none can login the system without the password, the card, or both. Basically, these protocols must rely on some robust cryptographic or mathematical foundations, such as discrete logarithms [6, 10] or quadratic residues [4] , to guarantee their security. Tan and Zhu introduced the first remote password authentication scheme based on inner and cross products of matrixes [9] . In the protocol of [9] , the system computes and records the secret information in each issued smart card via performing matrix multiplications and cross-product computations on some security parameters, and each user must also perform matrix inner-product computations to form her/his login request message. Through the normalization of matrixes defined in [9] , the system can check if a login request message is valid without keeping a large verification table. Besides, the users can freely choose and change their own passwords in the protocol, and it is more efficient than Chang-Hwang scheme [3] that is also a matrix-based remote authentication scheme using smart cards.
Although the authors of [9] have examined the security of their scheme, [5] has shown that the attackers can impersonate any registered user to login the system without being detected by the system in the scheme.
In addition, we find another weakness in Tan-Zhu scheme and it may also affect the security of the scheme. The proposed attack is based on the collusion of two registered users such that they can create valid login messages of unregistered users and then login the system successfully.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Tan and Zhu's scheme [9] . Chien-Jan-Tseng attack [5] on Tan and Zhu's scheme is shown in Section 3. A new attack on Tan-Zhu scheme is presented in Section 4. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 5.
Review of Tan-Zhu Scheme
In this section we review Tan and Zhu's password authentication scheme [9] .
The protocol consists of three phases, card initialization, login, and authentication phases. In the card initialization phase, a trusted card initialization center (CIC) issues a smart card to each user who has registered with CIC. In the login phase, the registered user attaches her/his card to the card reader and inputs her/his password, and then she/he forms and submits a login message to the system. After receiving the message, the system verifies whether it is correct or not in the authentication phase. If true, the system will accept the request; otherwise the system will reject it.
In order to perform the protocol of [9] , CIC (and the system) must prepare the necessary parameters for the protocol in advance. First, let p be a large prime and α be a primitive element in Galoid Field GF(p). CIC (and the system) chooses a one-way hash function f(·) and a pseudorandom number generator g(·). It also randomly selects two three-dimensional row vectors 
where c is a constant and
From Theorem 1, the authors of [9] concluded the following result.
Finally, CIC (and the system) chooses A as defined in Theorem 1 where n denotes the predicted number of users who will register with CIC. The details of the protocol are described as follows.
Phase I [Card Initialization]
If a new user u i decides to register with CIC, she/he firstly chooses her/his own password P W i and presents her/his identity ID i = (id i1 , id i2 ) and f(P W i ) to CIC. Then CIC performs the following tasks:
Step 1: Select one two-dimensional row vector A i = (a i1 , a i2 ) with a i1 = 0 and a i2 = 0 from A where (a i1 , a i2 ) has not been assigned to any other user. If
there is not such a vector, CIC must find a two-dimensional row vector which is linearly independent to any row vector in A and appends it to A such that A becomes a (n + 1) × 2 matrix, and then go to Step 1 in Phase I.
Step 2: Compute
Step 3: Store (P W 1 i , k i , f(·)) in a smart card and deliver the smart card to u i on a secure channel.
Phase II [Login]
When user u i is about to log into the system, she/he firstly attaches her/his own smart card to a terminal and inputs her/his password P W i . Afterwards, the smart card performs the following tasks:
Step 1: Compute
where • is the inner-product operator and T is the timestamp of the current time.
Step 2: Construct the login request message R = (P W 3 i , T, ID i ) and transmit it to the system.
Phase III [Authentication]
After receiving the login request message R, the system performs the following tasks to authenticate the request:
Step 1: Verify whether the format of ID i is correct or not. If false, the system will reject the request.
Step 2: Suppose that T * represents the time on which R is received. Verify whether the transmission time (i.e., T * −T ) is within the legal tolerant interval ΔT or not. If (T * − T ) > ΔT , then the request will be rejected.
Step 3: Compute
If P W 3 i = Z, then the system will accept the login request; otherwise the system will reject it.
Chien-Jan-Tseng Attack on Tan-Zhu Scheme
In [5] , Chien, Jan, and Tseng proposed an attack on Tan-Zhu scheme. The attack is described below.
Let user j have registered with CIC, where her/his card contains (
Since V 2 is public, user j can derive that N(k j × V 2 ) = (a, b) where a and b are
To impersonate user i, who has registered with CIC, to login the system, user j intercepts the login message R = (P W 3 i , T, ID i ) of user i and then computes
and submits R = (P W 3 i , T , ID i ) to the system where T is the timestamp of the current time. Thus, the system will accept the login request message R because that
Therefore, the request message R = (P W 3 i , T , ID i ) can pass the verification process and thus user j successfully impersonates user i to login the system.
Another Attack on Tan-Zhu Scheme
In this section, we present a new attack on Tan-Zhu scheme. The details are described as follows.
Let user i with identity ID i = (x, y) and user j with identity ID j = (y, x)
have registered with CIC where x = y. Hence, user i and user j, respectively,
and b are integers. Thus, we have that
Solving the above two congruences, we can obtain
Assume that user i colludes with user j. They can forge a pseudo identity ID x = (x, x) and then form and submit the login request message (P W 3 x , T, ID x )
to the system where
and T is the timestamp of the current time.
At
Step 1 in Phase III of Tan-Zhu protocol, the system must check the format of the identity of each login user. However, Tan and Zhu did not definitely define the content of the identity checking in their protocol. If all of the checking procedures the system has to perform are just to verify whether each received identity is a two-dimensional vector or not, the login request message (P W 3 x , T, ID x ) will be accepted by the system because
Similarly, they can also form a valid login request message (P W 3 y , T, ID y ) of the unregistered user with identity ID y = (y, y) and then successfully login the system where
g(y) (mod p),
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed another possible attack on Tan-Zhu remote password authentication scheme. If the format checking for the identity of each login user is not strict enough in Tan-Zhu scheme, the attack will work without g(·) which is kept secret by CIC and the system in the scheme.
